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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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SUSAN B. ANTHONY LIST, ET AL.,

Petitioners : No. 13-193

v. :

STEVEN DRIEHAUS, ET AL. :

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Washington, D.C.

Tuesday, April 22, 2014

The above-entitled matter came on for oral argument before the Supreme Court of the United States at 10:28 a.m.

APPEARANCES:

MICHAEL A. CARVIN, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of Petitioners.

ERIC J. FEIGIN, ESQ., Assistant to the Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; on behalf of the United States, as amicus curiae, supporting partial reversal.

ERIC E. MURPHY, ESQ., State Solicitor, Columbus, Ohio; on behalf of Respondents.

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 (10:28 a.m.)

3 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument  
4 first this morning in Case 13-193, Susan B. Anthony List  
5 v. Steven Driehaus.

6 Mr. Carvin?

7 ORAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL A. CARVIN

8 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

9 MR. CARVIN: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it  
10 please the Court:

11 Under this Court's great forward precedent,  
12 this case presents a clearly right and justiciable  
13 controversy. All agree that the test is whether or not  
14 there's a credible threat of enforcement. Here we know  
15 THAT there's a credible threat of enforcement because  
16 the Commission's Probable Cause panel in 2010 said that  
17 the speech at issue probably violated Ohio's false  
18 statement law.

19 Since an enforcement agency has already told  
20 us that this statement probably violates their law, we  
21 obviously face a clear and very credible threat of  
22 enforcement if we repeat those statements as we alleged  
23 we would do.

24 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Are you making that  
25 argument on behalf of the other organization? Susan B.

1 Anthony List, you have accurately described what  
2 occurred. But the other organization has never been  
3 charged before the Ohio Election Commission. Is there  
4 any reason to believe anybody's going to lodge a  
5 complaint against it?

6 MR. CARVIN: Well, Your Honor, when they  
7 filed their complaint, they alleged that they had not  
8 spoken those words because Susan B. Anthony had already  
9 been drawn into the Commission's procedures and the  
10 Commission had already found probable cause. So  
11 since --

12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How is that any  
13 different from -- how is that any different from the  
14 people in Younger, who the Court dismissed as having no  
15 standing because they hadn't been prosecuted despite the  
16 same identical claim? They were chilled, they might  
17 intend to do something similar, et cetera.

18 MR. CARVIN: Well, as Justice Brennan put it  
19 in Younger, the -- the speech that the other three  
20 speakers were going to engage in was not even of the  
21 same genre as that of the person who would be -- was  
22 being prosecuted, which is why the Court, quite  
23 correctly said, that their chilling effect was based on  
24 an imaginary or speculative fear of enforcement.  
25 Whereas here, COAST was going to say precisely the same

1 words that SBA had already been found to have probably  
2 violated the False-Statement Law. So it's hard to  
3 imagine or --

4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: I thought that the Court  
5 in Younger said with respect to those other three, that  
6 they had never been threatened with prosecution. I  
7 don't recall it making a distinction on the basis of  
8 what they wanted to talk about.

9 MR. CARVIN: Well, two of the people were  
10 labor picketers that had never been threatened and one  
11 was somebody who was simply teaching Marx in a classroom  
12 environment. They were quite distinct from the speaker  
13 who had been prosecuted under the incitement to violence  
14 law. And, again, Justice Brennan looked at their  
15 statements, compared them to the statements of the  
16 person who had been prosecuted and said they're not even  
17 of the same genre.

18 So we're not arguing that somebody could  
19 come in here and argue that anything that's  
20 controversial creates a credible threat of enforcement,  
21 but we've got a very specific concrete example. Speaker  
22 A says X, that's found to have a probable cause.  
23 Speaker B quite reasonably thinks if they've just  
24 dragged Speaker A in front of this Commission and the  
25 Commission has found probable cause, there's no reason

1 in the world to think that we won't be brought in.

2 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But the one question is  
3 who is the "they"? Now, it might be that Susan B.  
4 Anthony List is considered a group with real clout. So  
5 a candidate might be really concerned about Susan B.  
6 Anthony's speech. But the other organization maybe is  
7 not as well funded and the candidate says, well, a lot  
8 of things are said in political campaigns. I'll let  
9 this one go. This one doesn't hurt me as much.

10 MR. CARVIN: Two points, Justice Ginsburg.  
11 First, Driehaus had shown a very -- he was in the middle  
12 of a very tough reelection campaign and he had shown he  
13 was going to take all the steps he could to squelch this  
14 notion that he supported taxpayer abortions. He had  
15 already spent all the money in terms of SBA list. So it  
16 literally -- all he'd have to do is Xerox it to -- to  
17 come after COAST.

18 But I think the key point here is we don't  
19 have to negative every conceivable hypothetical on why  
20 Driehaus might not do this, and the Commission might not  
21 do that. There's a presumption that if you have  
22 violated the laws as the Probable Cause Panel said we  
23 probably had, that the agency is going to enforce the  
24 law. If you require us to negative every hypothetical,  
25 then the only way to test that hypothesis is to

1 engage in the speech and --

2 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How do you square this  
3 with Clapper?

4 MR. CARVIN: I apologize.

5 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Why isn't this as  
6 speculative as Clapper? You have to assume first that  
7 there's a candidate who is going to react by initiating  
8 an action, you have to assume further that a panel is  
9 going to render the same decision, and you have to  
10 assume even further that a Federal prosecutor -- that  
11 the prosecutor is going to agree and actually bring the  
12 case.

13 MR. CARVIN: Well, those are the steps that  
14 are required to put my clients in jail. But we suffer  
15 Article III injury well before any prosecutor prosecutes  
16 us. Once a complaint is filed, then we are subjected to  
17 very serious costs and risks of litigation in front of  
18 the Commission, and in the middle of an election  
19 campaign during the crucial weeks when we're trying to  
20 get our speech out.

21 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And I take it that's --  
22 that's enforced by subpoenas. If the speaker doesn't  
23 want to appear before the Commission, he can be served  
24 with a subpoena, which is judicially enforceable.

25 MR. CARVIN: There's -- there's two things,

1 Justice Kennedy. At the initial stage, if we don't  
2 respond to the complaint, the Commission's regulations  
3 make it clear that they may well view that as a default  
4 judgment and -- and enter a judgment against us right  
5 away.

6 Once the probable cause determination comes  
7 down, you have all of these kinds of subpoenas and very  
8 intrusive discovery of the sort you had in our case  
9 where they ask for our communications with everybody on  
10 the right wing of the political aisle, where we have to  
11 reveal our internal communications as well as those of  
12 others.

13 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Now, the State can  
14 characterize its own position, but do you understand the  
15 State to say that well, the existence of the Commission  
16 means that frivolous claims can be washed out, that they  
17 can actually get some protection by an advance ruling.  
18 Is that the State's position?

19 MR. CARVIN: No. Neither the Commission has  
20 argued that, and the Attorney General's amicus on our  
21 side makes it quite clear that there is no provision for  
22 doing it. If you read their rules, they have to go to a  
23 probable cause hearing in three days. There's literally  
24 no opportunity to wipe out so-called frivolous claims.

25 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But I mean, I thought -- I



1 thought their position was that this would -- would  
2 sharpen the controversy and make it more concrete or  
3 something like that.

4 MR. CARVIN: That's precisely right.  
5 They're arguing -- the whole point of this statute is  
6 some kind of truth-telling function, so they want us  
7 to --

8 JUSTICE GINSBURG: There is a provision for  
9 an advisory opinion, and that's a question that you are  
10 arguing strenuously that this statute violates the  
11 Constitution. You could have asked the Commission for  
12 an advisory opinion saying that the statute can't be  
13 enforced, but you didn't do that.

14 MR. CARVIN: No, we didn't because we think  
15 that's unconstitutional. Our constitutional claim here  
16 is the ministry of truth has no ability to judge our  
17 political speech as falsity. So obviously, we wouldn't  
18 have subjected ourselves voluntarily to the ministry of  
19 truth before we decided to challenge their  
20 constitutional validity. Then we would have been  
21 inflicting the constitutional injury on ourselves.

22 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. -- please.

23 MR. CARVIN: I was just going to say, even  
24 the Commission recognizes that the declaratory judgment  
25 advisory opinion procedure doesn't work in the heat of

1 an election campaign as it was here. But please --

2 JUSTICE KAGAN: Is -- is your argument  
3 dependent on the following two facts: The first that  
4 there was a probable cause determination, and the second  
5 that the Susan Anthony group and the other group wanted  
6 to repeat the exact same statement? Are those the two  
7 things that -- that ground your argument?

8 MR. CARVIN: We -- we think that makes it  
9 all -- all but dispositive, yes. That it's possible not  
10 to find a credible threat given those two facts. They  
11 had found this speech probably violated the Ohio  
12 election statute. And two, we were going to say exactly  
13 the same thing. So --

14 JUSTICE KAGAN: So if -- I'm sorry.

15 MR. CARVIN: Well, I just want to make it  
16 clear that the threat of enforcement is particularly  
17 acute here because not only is -- is enforcement power  
18 handed to a group of elected officials with certain  
19 ethical and political accountability things. Any one of  
20 our political opponents is -- is empowered under the  
21 statute to bring us in front of the Commission. So all  
22 they have to do is Xerox the Driehaus complaint, Xerox  
23 the probable cause finding, and Xerox a district court  
24 finding that said our speech was untrue. So since there  
25 is millions of people who were deputized under the

1 statute, who have every political motivation to squelch  
2 our speech in -- before a campaign, then I think --

3 JUSTICE KAGAN: But that would suggest  
4 something even broader. That would suggest that even in  
5 the first instance, before the probable cause  
6 determination was made, Susan Anthony would know that  
7 it's going to be speaking about a very controversial  
8 subject in which some people will think it's telling the  
9 truth and other people will think it's lying, and that  
10 there's a very good chance that somebody is going to  
11 bring this to the Commission. So that would suggest  
12 that they have standing even at that moment before the  
13 initial probable cause determination is made.

14 MR. CARVIN: Justice Kagan, we can agree  
15 that given the amorphous nature of this prohibition in  
16 the false statement, it's difficult to predict in  
17 advance who and when is going to do it. But to return  
18 to my prior answer, all of that ambiguity is gone once  
19 the expert agency has already told you that there's a  
20 probable cause to believe it violates it.

21 So this separates us from every other  
22 speaker who is simply concerned that they will be  
23 brought in front of the Commission. We have an  
24 identifiable track record that we have been brought in  
25 front of the Commission. And in that regard, I would

1 point out that the Secretary of State is obliged to  
2 refer anything to the Commission if he has -- should  
3 know that there's a violation.

4 Well, in the wake of the Probable Cause  
5 Panel's prior probability determination, it would seem  
6 that he's either ethically obliged to file a complaint  
7 against us or at least there's a very high likelihood  
8 that he would. And, again, I don't want us to lose  
9 sight of the other side of the calculus, which is that  
10 if -- if we have to prove all of these hypotheticals  
11 with certainty, if we have to engage in more the  
12 presumption that the State will enforce its own laws,  
13 you have created an insoluble dilemma for speakers,  
14 because you have -- you have conditioned their access to  
15 the political marketplace of ideas on a very serious  
16 threat of being dragged into this process.

17 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, let me ask you  
18 something going back in part to Justice Kagan.  
19 Basically, as a bottom line, you think there's nothing  
20 that could be salvaged from this process. Presumably,  
21 you think that even if your client speaks a falsehood,  
22 it still chills improperly.

23 MR. CARVIN: We think that if the commission  
24 is going to drag us in front of them to justify our  
25 political speech to a bunch of State officials that

1 they -- that is, A, Article III cognizable injury, and  
2 B, unconstitutional. I was explaining to  
3 Justice Ginsburg --

4 JUSTICE SCALIA: You're -- you're not asking  
5 us to resolve the constitutional question, just the  
6 question of whether you can raise the Constitution.

7 MR. CARVIN: All we're trying for is our day  
8 in court so that we can make this argument. And I was  
9 just explaining to Justice Ginsburg that that's a reason  
10 we wouldn't voluntarily invoke a procedure that we are  
11 about to challenge as constitutional. It would be  
12 cutting off our nose to spite our face.

13 And -- and I also would like to point out  
14 that this is election speech. And -- and that has two  
15 very significant components to it. One is that it's  
16 obviously the core of the First Amendment. This is how  
17 we choose our representatives in our democracy. But it  
18 also has an extraordinarily short shelf life. No one is  
19 listening to election speech hardly at all 60 days  
20 before an election, and the day after the election no  
21 one either speaks or listens. So you have about a  
22 2-month window where you can make these election speech  
23 points, which means two things. One is any distraction  
24 during that crucial period, as this Court noted in  
25 Wisconsin Right to Life, really does constitute a

1 serious Article III injury.

2 But the other point is you're never going to  
3 be able to adjudicate it within that 60-day window,  
4 right? You're never going to go from complaint to final  
5 judgment, which means that the speech will become  
6 arguably moot after the election, in which case you go  
7 to the capable of repetition yet evading review  
8 exception to mootness, which is essentially the same  
9 kind of prediction of future activity that's implicated  
10 here.

11 If you adopt the extraordinarily Draconian  
12 requirements that the Sixth Circuit imposed on credible  
13 threat, this means that you will literally never be able  
14 to challenge restrictions on election speech, right?  
15 Before the campaign it will be premature. During the  
16 enforcement proceeding, Federal courts have to abstain  
17 under Younger. And afterwards, it'll be deemed moot,  
18 and then no -- no possibility of capable of repetition  
19 yet evading review. So you have this -- this regime  
20 which has existed for decades in Ohio, where they  
21 continue to impose very serious burdens on speakers on  
22 what we consider a facially unconstitutional law, yet it  
23 has consistently evaded judicial review precisely  
24 because of the short time frames of the election --

25 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Why did -- why did you

1 say it would be found capable -- not capable of  
2 repetition? It seems to me that you were quite right to  
3 say before that this is most capable of repetition.

4 MR. CARVIN: Oh, if you accept our view of  
5 credible threat, then -- then you're -- you're entirely  
6 right, we would -- we would satisfy both the ripeness  
7 standard and the capable of repetition yet evading  
8 review standard. What I was trying to point out was  
9 that if you adopt the what we consider absurdly high  
10 straitjacket that the Sixth Circuit imposed on speakers  
11 trying to bring pre-enforcement challenges in the First  
12 Amendment context, that will essentially guarantee that  
13 these things are never brought, because by the time the  
14 election is done then you will have a mootness argument  
15 and you won't be able to satisfy the capable of  
16 repetition yet evading review standard. So you will --  
17 you will have put us in this Catch 22 endless cycle of  
18 suppressing speech, deterring speech, chilling speech,  
19 but never being able to get to a court to adjudicate our  
20 First Amendment --

21 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Your best cases you think  
22 are Steffel and Thompson and Babbitt? Are there others  
23 that are more --

24 MR. CARVIN: Well, Babbitt is certainly the  
25 most on point because there the prohibition was, like

1    ours, was saying something untrue, something false. And  
2    it's very important to note that the plaintiff in  
3    Babbitt neither specified what they were going to say in  
4    the future; it didn't specify what company it was going  
5    to bring this consumer publicity campaign against; and  
6    it expressly disavowed any intention to say anything  
7    false. But nonetheless, the Court found that "a  
8    credible threat was certainly impending," was the phrase  
9    they used.

10           And I also think the Court's recent decision  
11    in Holder is -- is quite on point there. There the  
12    plaintiffs didn't say that they were subject to the  
13    statute. They adamantly denied that the statute even  
14    read -- reached them. They weren't bringing a facial  
15    challenge as we are. They were bringing an as-applied  
16    challenge to the statute and there had never been a  
17    prior threat by any expert agency that their activities  
18    were going to be monitored.

19           I think American Booksellers is an excellent  
20    case as well, Justice Kennedy. There there had been no  
21    argument -- there had been no prior threat of  
22    enforcement. The State absolutely denied --

23           JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:           So please -- please  
24    define for me the rule you'd like us to announce?  
25    What's a credible threat?



1 MR. CARVIN: The narrowest rule, and the  
2 only rule we need to survive, is that if the enforcement  
3 agency has previously announced that your speech  
4 probably violates the law at issue, then you have a  
5 credible threat of future enforcement if you repeat that  
6 speech. I think --

7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Do we need them to say  
8 they are going to, even though the person who they said  
9 it against is not running again?

10 MR. CARVIN: Oh. Well, two points on that.

11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And how do you deal with  
12 Golden, in other words?

13 MR. CARVIN: Oh, yeah. Well, Golden was  
14 very simple. All the speaker there was concerned about  
15 was that one representative. We are not concerned about  
16 Representative Driehaus as such. We're concerned about  
17 people who supported the ACA's taxpayer-funded abortion,  
18 which is a politically salient issue to this day. We  
19 mentioned Representative Kaptur as well as  
20 Representative Driehaus in one of the false statements  
21 that's already been brought in front of the commission.  
22 And in 2010, Sherrod Brown was on the ballot for the  
23 Senate and he also was an ACA supporter.

24 So our complaint was not candidate specific.  
25 It didn't turn on any personal attribute of

1 Representative Driehaus. It turned on people who were  
2 supporting the ACA because of its taxpayer funding  
3 abortion provisions. And that remained politically  
4 salient and candidates who had engaged in precisely the  
5 same act as Representative Driehaus were on the ballot  
6 again in -- in 2012. So that -- that is our basic  
7 argument.

8 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So that you've been  
9 prosecuted before and that you are intending to do the  
10 identical speech against others.

11 MR. CARVIN: A preliminary finding and  
12 identical speech we think more than satisfies the  
13 credible threat thing for the reasons I was articulating  
14 to Justice Kennedy a few moments ago. We think this far  
15 exceeds the showing that was required in Holder,  
16 Babbitt, American Booksellers, and a number of other  
17 cases as well.

18 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Do you think this is a  
19 matter of standing or ripeness? The Sixth Circuit said  
20 ripeness.

21 MR. CARVIN: In all candor, Justice  
22 Ginsburg, I can't figure out the difference between  
23 standing and ripeness in this context. No question that  
24 we are being subject to something. I think the question  
25 is whether or not the threat is sufficiently immediate.

1 I think people tend to think about that as a ripeness  
2 issue, but I think all of the Court's teachings on  
3 standing and immediacy of injury from the standing cases  
4 apply equally here. So I would view standing and  
5 ripeness in this context as essentially coextensive.  
6 And I think the Sixth Circuit was wrong for both  
7 reasons.

8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Do you want us to  
9 just forget about the disclaimer issue and the  
10 commission procedure issue or even the as-applied issue?  
11 I got the sense from particularly footnote 7 in your  
12 reply brief that you're happy to just have those taken  
13 off the board.

14 MR. CARVIN: Well, can we take them one at a  
15 time? The disclaimer issue, Ohio agreed with us. So I  
16 think they took that off the table.

17 The procedure issue is inextricably  
18 intertwined with our Alvarez argument, that being  
19 subject to a process where the -- the State is  
20 determining the truth of our speech, we weren't saying  
21 the procedures in the abstract were problematical.

22 In terms of the as-applied challenge, we do  
23 disagree with the Solicitor General. We think that's  
24 certainly fit for review just as the as-applied  
25 challenge was in Holder and in American Booksellers and

1 in Babbitt. I do in candor, and I think this is what  
2 the footnote the Chief Justice was referring to goes to  
3 -- as a practical matter, we don't care. Frankly, the  
4 as-applied challenge was basically saying, look, even  
5 if -- even if the law is constitutional as applied to  
6 basic assertions of fact, it's not constitutional as  
7 applied to opinions.

8 We think Alvarez has essentially eliminated  
9 that distinction because the speech at issue in Alvarez  
10 was a pure assertion of fact. Frankly, the district  
11 court that we're going to go back to if we prevail here  
12 has already ruled that our interpretation of the ACA was  
13 an assertion of fact. So as a practical matter, it has  
14 no consequence. We're going to go back, make a facial  
15 challenge that (B) (9) and (B) (10) are facially  
16 unconstitutional under Alvarez. There's no -- we're not  
17 asking for any savings, constructions or -- or limited  
18 application. So it will be a pure question of law that  
19 is fit for immediate review. And as I say, we need --  
20 if we do prevail here on justiciability, we need to get  
21 relief right away because we have yet another election  
22 cycle approaching.

23 Unless there are further questions, I'll  
24 reserve the remainder of my time. Thank you.

25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

1 Mr. Feigin.

2 ORAL ARGUMENT OF ERIC J. FEIGIN

3 ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES,

4 AS AMICUS CURIAE, SUPPORTING PARTIAL REVERSAL

5 MR. FEIGIN: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice,  
6 and may it please the Court:

7 I'd like to begin, if I could, by addressing  
8 Justice Kagan's question, which Justice Sotomayor then  
9 followed up on. We think that the probable cause  
10 finding and the fact that they want to repeat  
11 essentially the speech that was made earlier are the two  
12 critical factors in this case and without that, none of  
13 their claims would be justiciable. As it is, we think  
14 that their purely legal First Amendment challenges are  
15 ripe for those particular case-specific reasons.

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, you -- you  
17 insist that they -- there has actually been a probable  
18 cause finding that their speech would violate the law  
19 before they would have standing?

20 MR. FEIGIN: Not necessarily that their  
21 particular speech would violate the law, but that there  
22 have been -- without the probable cause finding, it  
23 would simply be speculative whether particular speech  
24 would actually result in any sort of enforcement  
25 proceeding.

1           One critical aspect of this case --

2           CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:           Even in a case like  
3 this, where the procedures can be triggered by any  
4 citizen in the State?

5           MR. FEIGIN:           Well, Your Honor, again, we  
6 don't think that someone can come into court and say, I  
7 want to make some speech, I don't think that speech  
8 would be violating the statute, I don't have any good  
9 evidence that anyone else thinks my speech would violate  
10 the statute or that some sort of enforcement action  
11 would be brought against me, but nevertheless, I want to  
12 get into court --

13          CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:           Is that a realistic  
14 proposition? I mean, first of all, in the first place,  
15 surely you don't expect them to come in and say, I'm  
16 going to say something totally false and I'm afraid I  
17 might be prosecuted for that. But then you have to say  
18 they have -- you would never imagine that somebody else  
19 might think in a hotly contested election that their  
20 speech is false?

21          MR. FEIGIN:           Well, Your Honor, we may be  
22 simply debating how similar the previous speech that was  
23 a subject of a probable cause finding, or that there's  
24 some other reason to believe will be the subject of an  
25 enforcement proceeding has to be to the speech that the

1 plaintiffs allege that they intend to make. But we  
2 definitely don't think that a plaintiff can simply come  
3 into court and say, look, I want to make this speech, I  
4 don't think it violates the law.

5 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, what would happen,  
6 Mr. Feigin, what would happen if a candidate knew -- it  
7 seems actually quite plausible that Representative  
8 Driehaus would know -- that this was something that  
9 Susan Anthony or some other like group would talk about  
10 in his campaign, and he were to write letters to all  
11 these groups saying, if you start advertising in this  
12 way, if you put up billboards, I'm going to take you  
13 before the Ohio Commission. Would that be sufficient?

14 MR. FEIGIN: That would at least be  
15 sufficient, Your Honor, to bring a suit against  
16 Driehaus. That would be kind of similar to the  
17 situation in MedImmune v. Genentech, which was a civil  
18 suit that the putative defendant had standing to bring a  
19 declaratory judgment action to prevent --

20 JUSTICE KAGAN: I'm not sure I understood  
21 that. Is it sufficient that somebody has said, I'm  
22 going to bring an action against -- before the  
23 Commission, but there's been no prior Commission  
24 determination as to this speech. And it's just somebody  
25 saying, I'm going to go to the Commission and raise this

1 with them if you start speaking in this way. Would that  
2 present a credible threat?

3 MR. FEIGIN: That specific threat would be  
4 enough to allow for a lawsuit. And, Your Honor, I think  
5 there'd be a significant question whether the suit could  
6 only be brought against Driehaus, who brought the  
7 threat, or whether you could also join in the  
8 Commission. But as a practical matter, that wouldn't  
9 really make much difference because if constitutional  
10 claims were raised in that proceeding, the district  
11 court would be obligated to inform the State of Ohio and  
12 the State of Ohio would be entitled to intervene in the  
13 litigation.

14 JUSTICE KAGAN: Now, take it just a step  
15 further. Surely, there are some kinds of statements or  
16 -- I don't know. Maybe "surely" is the wrong word. Are  
17 there some kinds of statements where, even though the --  
18 the representative doesn't say, I'm going to do this,  
19 you know that somebody is going to do this, whether the  
20 representative or somebody else? It's the kind of  
21 statement that, given this process, it's just going to  
22 require too much fortitude to resist the temptation to  
23 bring this in front of this Commission.

24 MR. FEIGIN: Well, Your Honor, I think in  
25 the absence of good evidence of an enforcement



1 proceeding, it would simply be too speculative. But I  
2 would add that in this particular case, the credible  
3 threat of enforcement test might be relaxed to a certain  
4 extent, because this is a private attorney general  
5 statute. And the entire point of private attorney  
6 general statutes is to allow for enforcement in a wider  
7 range of circumstances than would be possible under most  
8 Federal laws, for example, which are enforced solely by  
9 the executive. That might be a reason, a case-specific  
10 reason why your hypothetical might have more salience  
11 here than it would in the Federal context.

12 Another difference between this and the  
13 Federal context is we don't have any potential statutory  
14 barriers to bringing this action. Congress hasn't  
15 decided to provide a cause of action only for a -- for,  
16 for example, final agency action, as it did in the  
17 Administrative Procedure Act, and it's not attempting to  
18 channel these claims through a particular agency.

19 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Are you arguing that the  
20 other organization, COAST, also has standing? Because  
21 you -- you seem to require for the credible threat for  
22 there to have been a proceeding before the Commission  
23 and there's been nothing with regard to the other  
24 organization.

25 MR. FEIGIN: Your Honor, we don't think that

1 the proceeding before the Commission has to involve the  
2 entity that wants to make the speech in the future.  
3 It's enough that it involves speech similar to the  
4 speech that the plaintiff is alleging that the plaintiff  
5 intends to make.

6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: So how do you distinguish  
7 the three in *Younger v. Harris* that the Court said  
8 didn't have standing?

9 MR. FEIGIN: I think in the same way the  
10 Petitioners do, Your Honor, and I think that's how we  
11 reconcile the case with *Steffel*, where one of the  
12 factors the Court looked to, to find a credible threat  
13 of enforcement in that case was the actual prosecution  
14 of the plaintiff's hand-billing companion.

15 One thing I would emphasize about this case  
16 is that in this particular context, this unique Ohio  
17 scheme, the administrative proceedings before the Ohio  
18 Elections Commission are the relevant enforcement  
19 proceedings. It wouldn't normally be the case that  
20 administrative proceedings that can result only in  
21 government speech would be considered enforcement  
22 proceedings for that purpose. But in this particular  
23 circumstance, not only can the Ohio Elections Commission  
24 recommend a case for further prosecution, but a decision  
25 by the Ohio Elections Commission is a decision by a

1 neutral decisionmaker following a full-dress adversary  
2 proceeding that someone has violated Ohio criminal law  
3 by knowingly misinforming the electorate in the context  
4 of a political campaign.

5 In that particular context, and particularly  
6 as to entities like Petitioners that engage in political  
7 advocacy on a regular basis, that kind of finding is a  
8 significant sanction. And, in fact, the State itself  
9 views it that way in two relevant ways. First of all,  
10 such a finding by the Commission is treated as an  
11 adverse effect for purposes of the statute that allows  
12 for judicial review. And second of all, if you look at  
13 actual orders by the Ohio Elections Commission, they  
14 sometimes refer to the finding of a violation in  
15 particular cases as a penalty.

16 Before my time is up, I would like to  
17 address a few things Petitioner said about the  
18 justiciability, for example, of as-applied challenges  
19 under this Court's decision in Holder. I think it's  
20 very significant that in Holder, the Court noted that  
21 there were -- Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project -- the  
22 Court noted that there had been 150 prosecutions brought  
23 under the statute that the plaintiffs in that case were  
24 challenging and that many of them had involved the same  
25 provision. And we think that's a circumstance in which

1 there would be a credible threat of prosecution because  
2 the plaintiffs had showed a pattern or practice of  
3 prosecution of similar conduct.

4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: How many proceedings  
5 have been brought under this Ohio statute?

6 MR. FEIGIN: So under the Ohio statute  
7 between 2001 and 2010, according to the statistics in  
8 the green brief by the Ohio Attorney General, it's a  
9 little bit over 500. And that's just for violations of  
10 this False-Statement Law or asserted violations of this  
11 False-Statement Law.

12 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Any -- any breakdown of  
13 whether those were brought by candidates or just  
14 interested citizens?

15 MR. FEIGIN: The -- we don't have statistics  
16 on that, Your Honor. The brief doesn't break it down.

17 If the Court has no further questions, we'd  
18 ask the Court to partially reverse and allow only the  
19 purely legal ripe, legal challenge State laws to  
20 proceed.

21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.  
22 Mr. Murphy?

23 ORAL ARGUMENT OF ERIC E. MURPHY

24 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

25 MR. MURPHY: Mr. Chief Justice, and may it

1 please the Court:

2 The Court should affirm the Sixth Circuit's  
3 judgment in this case because Petitioners have not  
4 established a credible threat of criminal prosecution  
5 and any other injury, to the extent it is adequately  
6 alleged, is not certainly impending. And I'd like to  
7 begin with the prior probable cause finding.

8 Petitioners repeatedly characterized the  
9 prior probable cause finding as a finding by the prior  
10 panel that the -- the speech at issue there was probably  
11 criminal. That's not what the finding indicated. It's  
12 a very, very low standard. It's not a standard that --  
13 it's -- it's well below a preponderance of the evidence,  
14 so "probably criminal" is way too high. It's just --  
15 it's analogous in the civil context to -- to a malicious  
16 prosecution case; one of the elements is to establish  
17 that a prior case lacked probable cause.

18 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Are you ready --

19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But you have to admit  
20 that --

21 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Are you prepared to  
22 represent to us that if they do the exact same thing the  
23 next election that they did in the last one, that you  
24 will not take action against them?

25 MR. MURPHY: No, I'm not -- I have not -- I

1 do not have authority to disavow. But their -- their  
2 argument that you need to disavow is inconsistent with  
3 some of the Court's cases suggesting that the threat  
4 implied by the existence of a law itself is not  
5 sufficient. And so they -- they fall back on this  
6 probable cause finding as suggesting that it creates the  
7 objective evidence necessary. But because -- because  
8 the probable cause finding is so low and because there  
9 are so many steps between the probable cause finding and  
10 the potential criminal prosecution --

11 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, but the criminal  
12 prosecution isn't all that they're complaining about.  
13 They're complaining about having -- having to be dragged  
14 through this same -- this same proceeding next time in  
15 the midst of an election campaign, and however minimal  
16 the finding that is ultimately made may be, they are  
17 going to be subject, for sure, to that proceeding in the  
18 next election campaign.

19 And I don't care if all the commission says  
20 is, you know, there is some reason to believe that they  
21 were lying. Even if it's that minimal, you are forcing  
22 them, and it is pretty sure that it's going to happen  
23 because somebody will complain, the candidate they are  
24 criticizing, you are forcing them to go through this  
25 procedure in the midst of an election campaign, right?

1           MR. MURPHY:           Well, with respect, Your Honor,  
2    I think there is a couple of answers. First off, I  
3    think it's speculative. If you look at the complaints,  
4    the SBA List complaint simply says they would like to  
5    engage in substantially similar activity in the future.  
6    Now, you have to keep in mind what that activity was.  
7    They weren't challenging anybody who voted for the  
8    Affordable Care Act. They were challenging specific  
9    congressmen. At JA-113, it says certain congressmen.  
10   That's in their complaint.

11           JUSTICE SCALIA:           Their organization is not  
12    an anti-Driehaus -- is that his name, "Driehaus"?

13           MR. MURPHY:           Yes, Your Honor.

14           JUSTICE SCALIA:           That's not what they are  
15    about. They are about opposition to the abortion  
16    funding portion of the Affordable Care Act and they're  
17    going to make the same, the same contentions against  
18    anybody else who runs for office who has voted for that  
19    Act, whether it's Driehaus or anybody else.

20           MR. MURPHY:           Well, with respect, the people  
21    that they targeted in 2010 were only pro-life Democrats  
22    who originally voted against the Act and then changed  
23    their vote in response to the executive order. This is  
24    at JA-52 when they announced their Votes  
25    Have Consequences Bus Tour. It wasn't against everybody

1 who voted for the Act.

2 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But your very argument,  
3 Mr. Murphy, to the effect that, well, probable cause is  
4 a very low standard, seems to me to work against you.  
5 It means that more complaints are more likely.

6 MR. MURPHY: Well, it depends on what you  
7 are talking about the relevant injury is. If the  
8 relevant injury is a criminal prosecution, I think it  
9 very much shows that a prosecution is entirely unlikely.  
10 And if your relevant injury is some of these preliminary  
11 injuries that they're asserting, I do think that the  
12 credible threat test is probably not even the test  
13 because, as the Court said in Clapper, injuries in that  
14 context had to be certainly impending.

15 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, but this is a point  
16 brought up by Justice Scalia's question as well. Don't  
17 you think there's a serious First Amendment concern with  
18 a state law that requires you to come before a  
19 commission to justify what you are going to say and  
20 which gives the commission discovery power to find out  
21 who's involved in your association, what research you've  
22 made, et cetera?

23 MR. MURPHY: Well, remember that the issue  
24 here is standing, so setting aside the -- the First  
25 Amendment concern should have no impact into whether an



1 Article III case or controversy exists. They would --

2 JUSTICE BREYER: Why? Why?

3 MR. MURPHY: Because --

4 JUSTICE BREYER: Why can't a person say, you  
5 know, there are things I want to say politically, and  
6 the Constitution says that the State does not have the  
7 right to abridge my speech, and I intend to say them.  
8 And if I say them, there's a serious risk that I will be  
9 had up before a commission and could be fined. What's  
10 the harm? I can't speak. That's the harm. Right? So  
11 why isn't that end of the matter?

12 MR. MURPHY: Well, the Court -- the Court --  
13 the Court -- has repeatedly said that chilling effect by  
14 itself is not the harm. The relevant harm in your hypo  
15 would be --

16 JUSTICE BREYER: Why shouldn't it be the  
17 harm? That is, whatever -- has any case said when  
18 somebody says, you want to speak in a campaign, and we  
19 have a law here that if you do we will throw you in jail  
20 and you really do want to speak and the law really does  
21 prevent you from speaking, why shouldn't that be the end  
22 of it?

23 MR. MURPHY: Well, remember the test has to  
24 be a credible threat of prosecution. What the Court --

25 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, I'm saying is there a

1 statute -- not a statute. Is there a case which says  
2 the little syllogism I just went through is not the law  
3 of the United States? Now, there may be. That's why I  
4 asked the question.

5 MR. MURPHY: So I think the closest case  
6 would be Golden, for instance, where the Court clearly  
7 indicated, and I quote, "The constitutional question,  
8 First Amendment or otherwise, must arise in the context  
9 of a specific live grievance."

10 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But that was a very  
11 special situation. In Golden they were going out after  
12 a particular candidate. It was not -- it was not a  
13 political view that an organization is taking, and they  
14 are not targeting this particular candidate, but they  
15 are targeting that issue, any candidate who supports  
16 that issue.

17 MR. MURPHY: Well, with respect, Your Honor,  
18 in Golden the plaintiff clearly indicated that he was  
19 targeting that congressman because of the congressman's  
20 votes on -- for a particular care package.

21 JUSTICE GINSBURG: But didn't the Court say  
22 that there wasn't -- once that congressman wasn't going  
23 to run for office any more, there was no suggestion that  
24 they wanted to talk about somebody else.

25 MR. MURPHY: So he did have suggestions that

1 he wanted to engage in substantially similar leafletting  
2 in the future, and the Court found them too speculative  
3 because he had only identified that one congressman.  
4 And so I think that's significant because I think by  
5 analogy that would suggest that the only single  
6 forward-looking allegations in SBA List's complaint at  
7 JA-122 are that it plans to engage in substantially  
8 similar activity in the future, but they don't identify  
9 any other candidates, just like they didn't identify any  
10 other candidates in Golden, just like they didn't  
11 identify any candidates in the Renne decision, which was  
12 part of the reason why the Court found the decision --  
13 that case right there.

14 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Murphy, you said  
15 there was no credible threat of prosecution, but what  
16 about the harm that is occurring? Mr. Carvin said it's  
17 a very short time. They're brought before the  
18 commission, they have to answer this charge that they  
19 lied, that they made a false statement. And that just  
20 that alone is going to diminish the effect of their  
21 speech because they have been labeled false speakers,  
22 and it costs money to defend before the commission,  
23 right? That's not --

24 MR. MURPHY: Well, keep in mind that the  
25 reputational harm they have essentially asserted for the

1 first time in this Court. They didn't assert any type  
2 of reputational injuries in the Sixth Circuit. And I  
3 think it would be entirely speculative to suggest that  
4 those would exist here with respect to these  
5 organizations.

6 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, I'm not sure it's a  
7 reputational harm. I mean, why isn't, as Justice  
8 Ginsburg suggested, the relevant harm the probable cause  
9 determination itself? There are voters out there and  
10 they don't know that probable cause is such a low bar as  
11 you describe it. They think probable cause means you  
12 probably lied, and that seems a reasonable thing for  
13 them to think and that's a relevant harm and we  
14 should just -- you know, we don't even need the  
15 prosecution to serve as the relevant harm. That seems  
16 quite enough.

17 MR. MURPHY: They -- they did not rely on  
18 any type of that type of harm below and I think -- a  
19 harm flowing from the misrepresentation of what the  
20 probable cause finding means -- I would think you would  
21 have to allege more than they have here with respect  
22 to -- that it would exist in this case.

23 There was no -- they hadn't -- there was no  
24 misrepresentations by SBA List, for instance, that this  
25 probable cause finding meant that they probably lied.

1 They told their supporters -- it's in the joint appendix  
2 at 74 and 75 -- that all it meant was that you go --  
3 that they found that you have to go before the full  
4 commission. They didn't say to their supporters that  
5 you probably lied.

6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I guess it was in  
7 the case of COAST; the problem is other people are going  
8 to be intimidated from helping them engage in their  
9 political speech. What was it, a billboard? The  
10 billboard company said --

11 MR. MURPHY: No more advertising.

12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- I'm not going to  
13 let you put your sign up on my billboard, I might be  
14 liable. So, I mean, they may have a certain fortitude  
15 and proceeding based on all the reasons that you've  
16 given, but they need third parties to help carry out  
17 their message and there is no reason to think those  
18 third parties have any commitment to their political  
19 message at all and the slightest whiff of, oh, this is  
20 going to be legal trouble, they say, forget about it.

21 MR. MURPHY: I guess two responses. Keep in  
22 mind that at JA-27 in the letter to Lamar, Driehaus  
23 indicated essentially that we reserve the right to  
24 proceed against you in the commission or in a court of  
25 law, indicating that he was already contemplating a

1     defamation action.  So if this statute -- talking about  
2     the redressability prong of standing with the directness  
3     test with respect to ripeness, he could have said the  
4     exact same thing and it would have chilled them Lamar  
5     from --

6             CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:             Well, no, but a  
7     defamation action, people sue everybody all the time.  
8     No one's going to take that seriously.  In fact, it's  
9     probably going to redound to the benefit of SBA and  
10    COAST to say the congressman is, you know, bringing a  
11    defamation action.  It highlights it, but it's another  
12    thing to have the State involved making a determination  
13    that there's probable cause that you lied.

14            JUSTICE SCALIA:             The mere fact that a  
15    private individual can chill somebody's speech does not  
16    say, well, since a private individual can do it, you  
17    know, the ministry of truth can do it.  That's not --  
18    that's not the law.

19            MR. MURPHY:             Well, the law -- so that's the  
20    First Amendment question, it seems to me.  On the  
21    standing question, it's whether this harm would have  
22    come up -- can't come about absent this law, and the  
23    fact that he notified the company that they might be  
24    thinking about a defamation action suggests that it's  
25    entirely speculative that it would have come about

1 absent this law.

2 JUSTICE KENNEDY: There's a curious  
3 inversion here. Usually we're concerned about citizen  
4 suits, too many people can challenge -- challenge the  
5 law. Here we're concerned that many, many citizens can  
6 bring the challenge against the candidate. So it's  
7 somewhat reversed. In other words, you have tens of  
8 thousands of private attorney generals waiting to pounce  
9 and get these people before the commission and have to  
10 follow discovery orders.

11 MR. MURPHY: Well, I mean, that's true. But  
12 keep in -- keep in mind that there -- when you -- when  
13 you think about the fundamental Article III purposes  
14 here, separation of powers and federalism and purposes, it  
15 seems to me that a finding in -- in this case that they  
16 have standing would undermine those. With respect to  
17 separation of powers, the Court has repeatedly said that  
18 courts are not -- in our constitutional system are not  
19 roving commissions designed -- assigned to pass judgment  
20 on the validity of the nation of laws, and --

21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Do you know of the 500  
22 cases that you mentioned earlier, how many actually  
23 ended up in full prosecutions?

24 MR. MURPHY: So there's -- since 1996, when  
25 the statute was amended to allow for this

1 pre-enforcement process, there have been five referrals,  
2 and then of those five referrals, three plea agreements.  
3 So there's only been three --

4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Three what? I'm sorry.

5 MR. MURPHY: Three plea agreements at the  
6 end of -- so there was five referrals from the  
7 Commission to the relevant prosecutor, and then -- and  
8 of those five cases, three charges were brought and plea  
9 agreements were essentially entered immediately.

10 So that -- that just also goes to show that  
11 the credible threat of any criminal prosecution is very  
12 unlikely.

13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, how many of  
14 those do you know were mooted out by the election?

15 MR. MURPHY: Well --

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: In other words, the  
17 proceedings are going on and people's speech is being  
18 chilled and it's back and forth, then the election is  
19 over, and people say, oh, forget about it.

20 MR. MURPHY: How many of the overall number  
21 of --

22 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: 500. You gave us  
23 some answers about how many of the 500 resulted in  
24 criminal prosecutions. And all I want to know is how  
25 many of the 500 proceedings were mooted out by the fact



1 that the election took place.

2 MR. MURPHY: So I -- so roughly 40  
3 percent -- 60 percent, there's a finding of no probable  
4 cause. That leaves 40 percent. And of those, I -- you  
5 know, Your Honor, I don't know the statistics on the  
6 number of dismissals. I would say that there are  
7 substantial number of --

8 JUSTICE BREYER: What would you say as a  
9 lawyer -- you're a lawyer for the Commission. You  
10 understand it better than I. I'm just making up an  
11 example. Do you think they'd prosecute this or not?  
12 Somebody walks in front of the House and a political  
13 opponent has a big sign that says murderer. No one  
14 asked. You said but he voted for legislation that led  
15 to the death of many cats. Would they prosecute that or  
16 not?

17 MR. MURPHY: Well, I think, Your Honor, it  
18 might fall within -- it -- it depends on the scope of  
19 the statute --

20 JUSTICE BREYER: I just want to know your  
21 opinion as the lawyer for the Commission, do you think  
22 that's going to be prosecuted or not?

23 MR. MURPHY: I think the -- I would say  
24 probably not, but -- but that's just my --

25 JUSTICE BREYER: Probably not.

1           MR. MURPHY:           -- personal opinion. Because  
2 they would say that you -- you would adopt the rule from  
3 the defamation context, that if -- if it can be  
4 interpreted under -- either as a hyperbole or either as  
5 a reasonable interpretation of an ambiguous statement or  
6 were the -- but if -- if there's any interpretation of  
7 the statement that is ambiguous, where it's true, it  
8 would fall within the defamation rule that it can't be  
9 considered false within the meaning of the statute. So  
10 the murder hypo, if it's actually he is a murderer of  
11 cats, it might -- it might mean that it's misleading.  
12 But by --

13           JUSTICE BREYER:           Why didn't they prosecute  
14 this here?

15           JUSTICE KENNEDY:           Yeah. Why wasn't that --

16           JUSTICE BREYER:           I mean, we've heard in  
17 other cases, you know, just recently, a very major case,  
18 where people really believed about the same thing and  
19 they were sincere in their beliefs. So why --

20           MR. MURPHY:           The commissioner has now fully  
21 conceded that it would be a difficult proposition in  
22 this case, certainly. But I -- I think it's the very  
23 nature of the probable cause finding that is --

24           JUSTICE ALITO:           Well, why don't the  
25 statistics that you provided us portray a system that

1 really limits core First Amendment speech without  
2 providing much of an opportunity for a judicial review  
3 if you're correct about -- about Article III here  
4 where -- you have a system where thousands of complaints  
5 are filed, and yet in the end, there's very few  
6 prosecutions. And you say, well, the filing of the  
7 complaint isn't enough and the probable cause  
8 determination isn't enough. So you have a system that  
9 goes on and on, year after year, where arguably there's  
10 a great chilling of -- of core First Amendment speech,  
11 and yet you're saying that basically you can't get into  
12 Federal court.

13 MR. MURPHY: Well, we're not saying that,  
14 Your Honor. I think we're just saying you can't get  
15 into Federal court in this case. And I do think that  
16 this -- those chilling effect concerns should not play a  
17 role in the Article III cases or controversy --

18 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, but why wouldn't it  
19 get into Federal court? I mean, your own office  
20 expresses grave concern about the constitutionality of  
21 this statute. So that suggests somebody should be able  
22 to get into Federal court to do this. But I don't see a  
23 way where you would allow a pre-enforcement challenge.  
24 One would have to go through the entire process and get  
25 to the end of it and get a judgment to enable a

1 challenge under your theory; is that right?

2 MR. MURPHY: Well, I think under our theory,  
3 it really depends. There's two types of cases that are  
4 brought. One is a case like *Babbitt*, where they're  
5 saying the law is ambiguous, it could mean A or it  
6 could -- it could mean B. If it means A, my speech is  
7 covered within it. There, all you essentially have to  
8 do is allege you want to engage in the speech that would  
9 fall within the rule. But that's not what they're doing  
10 here. They're saying their speech falls completely  
11 outside this law, this unambiguous law, the distinctions  
12 between false and true, but we're going to get  
13 prosecuted anyways. And in that context, I think you do  
14 have to allege what the government suggested is more  
15 objective evidence that you're going to be prosecuted  
16 outside --

17 JUSTICE BREYER: I had a reason for asking  
18 what sounds like a silly hypothetical, but a possible  
19 one. We understand how people take different views on  
20 that. And then you have a hard time, it seems to me,  
21 distinguishing this case from that one in terms of their  
22 exercising their authority. And so at least it must  
23 raise a question, a First Amendment question on the  
24 merits. It seems pretty serious. So if you lose on  
25 this procedural matter, how quickly can you get this

1 decided? I mean, there are elections coming up. People  
2 would like to know. They want to know what they're  
3 supposed to say. And how long is all this procedural  
4 skirmishing going to take, which in and of itself is an  
5 obstacle to what they might say in the next election?

6 MR. MURPHY: So procedural skirmishing,  
7 you're talking about within --

8 JUSTICE BREYER: I mean, you're saying,  
9 well, they don't have standardized -- you know, I was  
10 interested in this field, administrative law, and even  
11 my class, despite the scintillation, would sometimes go  
12 to sleep when I got to such questions.

13 (Laughter.)

14 JUSTICE BREYER: So -- so I'm saying that  
15 these seem to be preliminary questions on a matter in  
16 respect to which there seems serious doubt. I'll repeat  
17 myself. The elections are coming up. And people have  
18 to know what they're supposed to say and what they can  
19 say and what they can't. So how do we get this --

20 MR. MURPHY: Well, it seems to me your  
21 question is the -- your question is suggesting that the  
22 underlying law is -- is -- there's serious doubts about  
23 the constitutionality of the underlying law.

24 JUSTICE BREYER: That --

25 MR. MURPHY: And that provides -- that

1 doesn't provide any basis. The entire purposes of  
2 Article III's case of controversy requirement is to  
3 ensure that courts only decide constitutional questions  
4 in concrete cases. And to allow the merits to slip into  
5 the Article III question fundamentally undermines  
6 the separation of powers --

7 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, I would say one of  
8 the purposes of Stanley is to allow people who are  
9 really going to be heard to be able to be heard in  
10 court. Well, of course, if they're not going to be  
11 heard, there's no reason. And what the merits  
12 discussion is designed to suggest is that there are real  
13 people who would really like to speak in an election  
14 campaign. And if they feel they can't, they are really  
15 being hurt. That's what the other side is arguing. And  
16 I've listened to the argument. I'm curious as to the  
17 practicalities. If they're right, when is this going to  
18 be heard and decided in your opinion?

19 MR. MURPHY: So the -- are you talking if  
20 there's a remand in the district court, or --

21 JUSTICE BREYER: You tell me how to do it.

22 MR. MURPHY: Well, I think that case should  
23 be dismissed, obviously.

24 JUSTICE BREYER: I'm saying if you were to  
25 lose on the --

1           MR. MURPHY:            Okay.  If I was to lose?  Oh,  
2    you could -- frankly, if you remanded finding a concrete  
3    case here, you could instruct the district court to  
4    certify to the Ohio Supreme Court, for instance, which  
5    could give an immediate authoritative interpretation of  
6    the law and it could -- it could include all the  
7    relevant narrowing constructions that this Court has  
8    adopted --

9           CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:            Well, that will  
10   speed things up.

11           (Laughter.)

12           CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS:            You don't even  
13   want -- you don't even want the district court to decide  
14   it.  You want to go through a certification process that  
15   will bring in a whole another court system.

16           MR. MURPHY:            But it has to decide the scope  
17   of a law.  As the United States v. Williams said, to  
18   determine the constitutionality of the law, you need to  
19   know its scope.  And -- and the entire suggestion here  
20   that their speech is covered suggests that the scope --  
21   or the scope of the law is much broader than the Ohio  
22   Supreme Court could interpret it to be.

23           JUSTICE ALITO:            Well, what -- what narrowing  
24   construction would be consistent with Alvarez?

25           JUSTICE SCALIA:            Yeah, what?  I can't

1 understand what that would be. It has to be really  
2 false. Is that it?

3 (Laughter.)

4 MR. MURPHY: Well, I think -- I think -- I  
5 think Alvarez is completely distinguishable as being  
6 about false statements in the abstract. This Court  
7 already held in McIntyre that the State has a compelling  
8 interest in policing fraud and liability of statements  
9 in the election context because of the risk to the  
10 public from those statements. And Mark Twain --

11 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, Alvarez wasn't about  
12 false statements in the abstract. It was a criminal  
13 prosecution for making particular false statements. And  
14 they were as hard factual statements as you will ever  
15 find. Did somebody receive the Congressional Medal of  
16 Honor or not?

17 MR. MURPHY: No, I agree with that. There  
18 was a false statement of a verifiable -- verifiable  
19 fact, but it was a false statement anywhere, anytime;  
20 even like at home, if you make the statement, it could  
21 be covered. What we're saying here is that false  
22 statements in the election context, the State has a much  
23 more compelling interest in that context because, as  
24 the Court said in McIntyre, the -- the false statements  
25 can have an impact on the election.



1           Of course, there's false positives if the  
2           commission gets it wrong. But think about the false --  
3           false negatives that slip through when somebody is  
4           making a false statement, and that actually impacts a  
5           campaign, leading to somebody voting for somebody else.

6           JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:           But how are you going to  
7           prove -- how are you ever going to prove that one false  
8           statement cost somebody an election?

9           MR. MURPHY:           What's that?

10          JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR:           How are you ever going  
11          to prove that one false statement cost somebody an  
12          election?

13          MR. MURPHY:           Well, I don't think we -- I  
14          don't think we have to prove that to get a conviction in  
15          any case. I think we just prove that their false  
16          statements can have impacts on elections, and that shows  
17          the interest in this case, as compared to the interest  
18          in Alvarez, in which the false statements could be made  
19          at any time, under any circumstances. It wasn't -- it  
20          wasn't narrowly tailored to the election context.

21          JUSTICE SCALIA:           Do you think that the  
22          allegedly false statement here was a false statement of  
23          fact?

24          MR. MURPHY:           I think there's a good argument  
25          that it was not, that there was a false statement of --

1 that there's reasonable interpretations of this  
2 ambiguous Affordable Care Act, and if so --

3 JUSTICE SCALIA: There's a good argument on  
4 the other side. But it's an argument over a fact, isn't  
5 it, whether this person was responsible for the  
6 Affordable Care Act. I mean that was the charge, you  
7 know, that this person made the decisive vote, right, in  
8 the --

9 MR. MURPHY: Well, that's a different case.  
10 This charge was he voted for taxpayer-funded abortion,  
11 was the -- was the charge. And so it's whether this  
12 Act --

13 JUSTICE SCALIA: But by voting -- by voting  
14 for that Act.

15 MR. MURPHY: For the Act, yes.

16 JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes.

17 MR. MURPHY: So it's whether the Act covers  
18 taxpayer-funded abortion, and that's a complex question  
19 that if the court were to -- if the Ohio Supreme Court,  
20 through certification, were to adopt the Bose standard,  
21 it would suggest that it might not be covered because  
22 the Bose standard suggests that speech about an  
23 ambiguous topic cannot be false under the actual malice  
24 standard. So this whole -- this whole speech could be,  
25 through certification, eliminated and the statute

1 narrowed to cover only false statements of verifiable  
2 fact.

3 JUSTICE SCALIA: And then all you have to do  
4 is litigate it. That's all.

5 (Laughter.)

6 JUSTICE SCALIA: You -- you make the  
7 statement, and then, you know, you can litigate it on  
8 the basis of whatever the Ohio Supreme Court says.  
9 Right?

10 MR. MURPHY: Well --

11 JUSTICE SCALIA: I mean, let's litigate  
12 whether it's factually inaccurate or legally inaccurate,  
13 right? It's a lawsuit.

14 MR. MURPHY: So we're talking about the  
15 scope of the law, correct?

16 JUSTICE SCALIA: Yes, we are. But I mean,  
17 we're talking about whether this law imposes limitations  
18 upon the freedom of speech. And if you say whenever you  
19 do it, you are going to have a lawsuit, you're going to  
20 be hauled before this commission. You may have a good  
21 case, you may not have a good case, but you have to  
22 justify yourself to this commission before you can --  
23 before you can make the assertion.

24 MR. MURPHY: Well, that's not true. That  
25 doesn't happen in every case. It makes -- you're making

1 it sound like the commission hears every political  
2 statement out there. But it has to be filed by a  
3 person, and only one person filed a complaint against  
4 the SBA this last time, and he is in Africa now. So I  
5 don't think he'll be filing complaints any time soon.

6 JUSTICE SCALIA: He really lost, didn't he?

7 (Laughter.)

8 MR. MURPHY: I see my time is up. Could I  
9 just ask the --

10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.

11 Mr. Carvin, you have 5 minutes.

12 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF MICHAEL A. CARVIN

13 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

14 MR. CARVIN: A few brief points. I think  
15 the key point to take away from the colloquy with  
16 Mr. Murphy is that when he was asked, How do you bring a  
17 pre-enforcement challenge, his only solution was to  
18 admit you're lying before you speak. Well, obviously  
19 that completely defeats the value of your speech. No  
20 speaker is ever going to do it. You're not going to  
21 confess to a crime before you speak. And I would point  
22 out in Babbitt they didn't say they were going to lie.  
23 They said just the opposite, and they nonetheless had  
24 standing.

25 On the certification point, further delay in

1 the Ohio Supreme Court for a limiting construction that  
2 we don't want, that can't possibly do it. After  
3 Alvarez, the stacked opinion distinction is of no legal  
4 relevance. We don't want a limiting construction. We  
5 want to say that anything, fact or opinion, is  
6 unconstitutional to limit under the false statement law.

7 I point out that we did litigate in front of  
8 this very same district court judge the fact/opinion  
9 issue in the libel case, where it does have some  
10 resonance, and he's already found that our assertion was  
11 factual. So we don't want to go on that tangent.

12 If the Court would just look at them,  
13 Browskins and Citizens United, those cases articulate as  
14 well as any can, when you are making a facial challenge  
15 to a First Amendment, the last thing you want to do is  
16 abstain to State court judges because you actually  
17 exacerbate the constitutional injury through the delay  
18 and the fact that you've got to go through declaratory  
19 judgments, when our entire point is it's  
20 unconstitutional for us to say, "Mother, may I?" before  
21 we speak.

22 As to Mr. Murphy's attempt to downplay the  
23 probable cause finding, on 7A attached to their brief  
24 they have what the probable cause finding is. And it  
25 says that there is probable cause to believe that

1 there's been a violation of the law alleged and that the  
2 complaint has occurred.

3 Under this Court's probable cause  
4 determination, that means reasonable people would  
5 believe that a violation has occurred, even though you  
6 need to show it by clear and convincing evidence, and  
7 even though my opponent claims that any reasonable  
8 interpretation of this law is not false. Well, that  
9 means that they've already found that through clear and  
10 convincing evidence we are advancing not only a false,  
11 but an unreasonable interpretation of the ACA, which  
12 simply, of course, exacerbates the credible threat.

13 And I think my final point will be, he  
14 says -- well, two things. One is he says we didn't  
15 allege with specificity the kind of speech that we were  
16 going to say in the future. We said we're going to  
17 engage in the same or similar speech. I don't think the  
18 language, the English language, permits a more direct  
19 and precise articulation of what we're going to say in  
20 the future.

21 The only difference will be, instead of  
22 Representative Driehaus, we will substitute  
23 Representative Kaptur, another pro-life Democrat in Ohio  
24 who we have already criticized for her vote on the ACA  
25 and which we would have repeated in the 2012 election

1 cycle but for the chilling effect.

2 This is obviously completely different from  
3 Golden, which my opponent continues to raise, where  
4 the Court found that the only interpretation of the  
5 facts is that the plaintiff's, quote, "sole concern" was  
6 with the representative at issue, who had gone off to a  
7 judgeship.

8 It is blazingly obvious that our sole  
9 concern is not Representative Driehaus. It is any  
10 legislator that voted for an Act that we believe  
11 devoutly has "taxpayer-funded" and "abortion" in it.

12 So we're facing a credible threat. We ask  
13 the Court to lift this yoke so that we can become full  
14 participants in the next election cycle.

15 Unless there are any further questions, I  
16 thank you.

17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel,  
18 counsel.

19 The case is submitted.

20 (Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m., the case in the  
21 above-entitled matter was submitted.)

22

23

24

25

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